Andy Burnham Just Got Another Slap in the Face – And His Big Plan Is Falling Apart
Andy Burnham’s first weeks as Britain’s Prime Minister have been dominated by ambitious promises. He entered Downing Street determined to change the way Britain is governed, move power away from Westminster and place the regions at the centre of economic decision-making. His most visible symbol of that ambition is “No 10 North”, the Manchester-based government hub intended to become the nerve centre of his programme of decentralisation.
Yet Burnham’s project is already facing serious questions.
The Prime Minister has described No 10 North as a fundamental transfer of power away from Whitehall. He wants it to coordinate national and regional government, drive economic growth and give local areas greater influence over investment and development.
But turning that vision into reality will be considerably harder than announcing it.
The latest challenge concerns Burnham’s housing strategy. His Government is preparing to give regional mayors new powers to “call in” major planning applications and, in certain circumstances, overrule local councils. The intention is clear: Britain needs more homes, and Burnham believes local objections have too often delayed development.
On paper, this looks like a decisive response to the housing crisis. In practice, it could create a political battle with the very local communities that Burnham claims his programme is designed to empower.
Britain desperately needs more housing. More than 1.34 million households are reportedly waiting for social housing, while the Government remains behind its target of building 1.5 million homes over five years.
Burnham therefore has a difficult choice. If he allows local councils to block large developments indefinitely, his housing ambitions may fail. If he gives mayors the power to override those councils, he risks accusations that he is replacing one centralised system with another.
That contradiction goes directly to the heart of his political project.
Burnham’s message is that Britain has been too centralised for too long. He argues that decisions should be taken closer to the people affected by them. His own government website describes No 10 North as a new “situation room” designed to make power flow out of Whitehall and into regions across the country.
But local democracy means that communities will sometimes disagree with regional leaders.
A council might oppose a large housing development because residents fear pressure on roads, schools, healthcare or green spaces. A regional mayor may believe that the development is essential for economic growth. Giving the mayor the final say may produce faster construction, but it does not necessarily produce greater public consent.
This is the first major test of Burnham’s promise to decentralise Britain.
His critics can argue that the Prime Minister is not really giving power to communities. Instead, he is moving power from one level of government to another.
The Government, however, has a strong response. Britain cannot solve a housing crisis if every major development can be delayed indefinitely by local opposition. National targets require national coordination, and regional mayors may be better placed than individual councils to consider housing, transport and infrastructure together.
There is some evidence that the new approach could have momentum. Ten of England’s 14 devolved mayors reportedly support the proposed planning powers. The policy is intended not simply to override councils but to encourage more coordinated development across wider regions.
That means the policy is not necessarily “falling apart”. In fact, some parts of Burnham’s programme are moving forward.
The more serious question is whether his ambitions are moving forward quickly enough.
No 10 North itself is already attracting scepticism. Critics have dismissed the Manchester hub as a gimmick, arguing that changing the location from which the Prime Minister works does not automatically change Britain’s economic performance. Burnham has strongly rejected that criticism, insisting that the initiative is about shifting real power rather than simply changing the Prime Minister’s postcode.
The symbolism nevertheless matters.
For decades, British governments have been heavily concentrated in London. Burnham’s decision to establish a permanent northern base is intended to demonstrate that political power should no longer be overwhelmingly associated with Westminster.
But symbolism has limits.
People in Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Newcastle and other northern communities ultimately want better transport, affordable housing, higher productivity and well-paid jobs. They will not judge No 10 North by the number of meetings held there. They will judge it by whether their lives improve.
That is why Burnham’s economic strategy is so important.
He has now announced that No 10 North will take responsibility for driving economic growth, moving part of that responsibility away from the Treasury. Burnham argues that the Treasury has traditionally had a “dual role” in controlling public finances while also being expected to generate economic growth. His proposal is intended to give economic development a stronger regional focus.
It is an enormous experiment.
If it succeeds, Burnham could demonstrate that regional government can make faster and better economic decisions than Whitehall. If it fails, opponents will argue that he created another layer of bureaucracy without solving the underlying problems.
There is also a danger that Manchester itself becomes too dominant.
Burnham’s political identity is deeply connected to Greater Manchester. That experience gives him credibility, but it also creates a potential problem. Other regions may ask whether “No 10 North” really means power for the whole of England or simply greater influence for Manchester.
Burnham has explicitly said that the purpose of No 10 North is to distribute power across the country, not to concentrate it in Manchester. His original plan included extending devolution to other regions and nations.
The challenge will be proving that this actually happens.
The Prime Minister has also made extremely ambitious promises on homelessness. He has pledged to end rough sleeping by Christmas and has committed hundreds of millions of pounds to the effort. The Government has announced a £102 million new funding package, contributing to a wider £442 million national programme.
Again, the ambition is enormous.
But Burnham himself has acknowledged that government money alone may not be enough. Councils, charities and community organisations will all have to contribute.
This illustrates a wider problem with Burnham’s premiership.
He has made a series of promises that appeal strongly to voters who want government to solve long-standing problems. Housing. Homelessness. Public transport. Regional inequality. Essential utilities. Economic growth.
But every promise creates an expectation.
If the Government cannot deliver quickly, the same ambition that initially attracted voters can become a political weakness.
This is especially true because Burnham’s political brand is based on delivery. As Mayor of Greater Manchester, he built his reputation around practical interventions in transport, homelessness and regional government. Now that he is Prime Minister, he must demonstrate that the same approach works across the whole country.
The scale is completely different.
Greater Manchester is one region. Britain is an entire state with competing economic interests, different political institutions and enormous financial pressures.
Burnham’s transport ambitions demonstrate the problem particularly clearly. He wants to improve northern rail services, support Northern Powerhouse Rail and expand the Greater Manchester Bee Network. He has also backed the return of a Birmingham-Manchester high-speed connection and greater public control of rail services.
These are potentially transformative projects.
They are also extremely expensive.
Britain has a long history of announcing major infrastructure projects only for costs to increase and timetables to slip. Burnham will therefore need to demonstrate not only that his ideas are desirable, but that they can be financed and delivered.
That is where the upcoming Budget becomes crucial.
Burnham’s Government is operating in a difficult fiscal environment. Its ambitions for housing, infrastructure and public services compete for money with healthcare, defence and other national priorities.
If the Government increases taxes to finance its programme, Burnham could face criticism from taxpayers. If it cuts other spending, affected groups will complain. If it borrows heavily, financial markets may become concerned about the sustainability of the public finances.
There is no painless solution.
This is why the claim that Burnham has suffered another “slap in the face” should be understood as political rhetoric rather than proof that his programme has collapsed.
The evidence so far suggests something more complicated.
Some parts of his programme are encountering resistance. Local councils may oppose stronger mayoral planning powers. Critics question whether No 10 North is more than symbolism. Housing targets remain difficult. His homelessness pledge faces enormous practical obstacles. And his plans for regional economic transformation require substantial investment.
But other parts of the programme are progressing.
No 10 North is operating. Ministers and regional leaders are meeting there. New planning powers are being developed. Economic responsibilities are being shifted towards the Manchester hub. Regional projects are being identified.
The project is therefore not falling apart yet.
The real question is whether it can survive the transition from political vision to measurable results.
That transition is always difficult.
Political speeches can promise a “rewired Britain”. Government departments have to produce legislation. Budgets have to contain actual numbers. Councils have to approve developments. Contractors have to build houses and railways. Public services have to function.
That is where grand political projects are ultimately tested.
Burnham’s greatest advantage is his clarity of purpose. He knows what he wants Britain to become: more decentralised, more regionally balanced and more willing to use public power to shape the economy.
His greatest weakness may be the sheer number of problems he is attempting to tackle simultaneously.
If even a few major projects encounter delays, funding problems or political resistance, opponents will portray the difficulties as evidence that the entire strategy is failing.
The Prime Minister therefore needs to demonstrate progress quickly.
Not slogans.
Not press conferences.
Not new offices.
Results.
A family needs an affordable home. A commuter needs a reliable train. A homeless person needs somewhere safe to sleep. A business needs infrastructure and skilled workers. A region needs investment that creates lasting employment.
If Burnham can deliver those things, the criticism will eventually fade.
If he cannot, the “slap in the face” narrative will become much more powerful.
For now, however, it is too early to declare his big plan dead. Burnham has been Prime Minister for only a short time, and several of his most important reforms are still being designed or introduced.
The next stage will determine whether his experiment becomes a genuine transformation of British government or another ambitious political project that could not survive contact with reality.
Burnham has spent years arguing that Westminster is broken.
Now he has the opportunity to prove that he can fix it.
The question is whether Britain will give him enough time—and whether his plans can deliver enough visible progress before patience runs out.