Nigel Farage is getting the gay vote, but for a worrying reason (Image: Getty)

I’m talking about the UK’s gay population, which is rallying to Reform. No longer militantly left-wing, they’re taking pride in Nigel. Not gammon, but gay. What’s going on?

Reform UK is now the most popular party amongst gay and bisexual British men, with 25% saying they’d vote for Farage, according to research from More in Common. That compares with 19% for Zack Polanski’s Green Party.

Online threads show that even gay men who swear they’d never vote Reform understand the appeal. Why? Because they’re worried about the rise of Islamic sectarianism, fuelled by mass immigration that Farage plans to reverse. As one gay man on a Reddit thread put it: “The average Muslim in the UK believes that LGBT people do not deserve human rights, and given the chance they would criminalise same sex relationships.”

Green leader Zack Polanski may be both Jewish and gay, but he’s happy to work with Ali. He’s hardly the first left-winger to cosy up to conservative Muslims with primitive views on women and gay rights. Labour has been doing it for decades.

It’s happened elsewhere too. In the 1979 Iranian revolution, left-wing activists and Islamists joined forces in a coalition to oust the Shah. After the Mullahs won, the leftists were left to hang. Literally.

We’re seeing a similar alignment today. And it’s triggered an unlikely alliance between Reform and gay men. They make strange political bedfellows, but we live in strange times. Farage certainly won’t mind if the gay vote helps him sweep up the votes in next month’s elections.

Farage Is Winning Votes From an Unlikely Source – and It Tells a Troubling Truth About the UK

Nigel Farage’s political coalition is becoming more complicated than the traditional image of a Reform UK voter might suggest.

For years, Farage’s support was closely associated with Brexit, immigration, Euroscepticism and voters who felt alienated from the political establishment. But recent research suggests that Reform’s appeal now extends beyond its traditional base, with significant numbers of former Labour voters, Conservative voters and people who previously stayed away from elections considering or supporting the party.

That shift offers an important insight into the changing British electorate. It suggests that Reform’s rise cannot simply be explained as a temporary protest against whichever party happens to be in government.

Research from More in Common and UK in a Changing Europe found in 2025 that only around two in five current Reform supporters had actually voted for Reform in the 2024 general election. Many had previously supported Labour, the Conservatives or had not voted at all. The study found that 42% of voters were either Reform supporters, 2024 Reform voters or people who would consider voting for the party.

A separate analysis by Nuffield College, Oxford, found that 70% of Reform supporters in its British Election Study panel data had not voted Labour in any UK general election during the previous 20 years, or had never voted Labour. That finding suggests that Labour’s losses to Reform should not automatically be interpreted as a mass movement of traditional Labour voters.

The more revealing story is that Reform appears to be attracting voters from several different political backgrounds at once.

The Conservative-to-Reform movement

One of the clearest sources of Reform’s growth has been former Conservative voters.

YouGov’s 2026 voter study found that 26% of people who voted Conservative at the 2024 general election had switched to Reform UK. Another 10% were unsure how they would vote. Only half of the Conservatives’ 2024 voters in the study said they would currently vote Conservative again.

The reasons given by these former Conservative voters are particularly revealing.

Immigration was the most prominent issue among Conservative voters who had moved to Reform, with 86% identifying it as one of the most important issues facing Britain. Defence, the cost of living, the NHS and the wider economy also featured prominently.

This matters because it complicates the idea that Reform’s appeal is based entirely on a single issue.

Immigration remains central, but voters moving towards Farage’s party also express concerns about national security, household finances and public services.

The demographic profile is also distinctive.

YouGov found that 78% of Conservative-to-Reform switchers were over 50. Only 13% had voted Remain in the 2016 EU referendum, while just 25% had a degree. The group was also majority male.

In other words, Reform has established a particularly strong relationship with voters who were already inclined towards Brexit and who subsequently became dissatisfied with the Conservatives’ record.

But Reform is not simply the new Conservative Party

The story becomes more interesting when looking at Reform’s wider support base.

More in Common’s research found that Reform’s supporters were increasingly diverse in their previous voting histories. Many had arrived from Labour, the Conservatives or non-voting backgrounds. Only 16% had previously voted for UKIP or the Brexit Party, despite the historical connection between those parties and Farage.

This is significant.

If Reform were simply inheriting the old UKIP vote, its political ceiling would arguably be easier to understand. Instead, the party appears to have developed a broader coalition.

That coalition contains voters with different economic interests and political histories.

Some want lower taxes and a smaller state. Others are attracted by promises to strengthen public services and protect living standards. Some prioritise immigration and border control. Others are motivated by distrust of established political parties.

This creates both an opportunity and a challenge for Farage.

The opportunity is obvious: a party that can bring together voters from different political traditions can potentially build a much larger electoral coalition.

The challenge is that those voters do not necessarily want the same things.

The surprising role of non-voters

Perhaps the most unusual element of Reform’s support is its relationship with people who traditionally do not vote.

The Times recently reported that Reform is specifically targeting “low-propensity voters” — people who often stay away from general elections but have demonstrated that they can turn out during particularly significant political contests.

This is important because turnout can change the composition of an election.

A voter who rarely participates may have strong political opinions but little faith that voting will change anything. Such people can remain invisible in traditional party structures until a campaign gives them a reason to participate.

The Brexit referendum demonstrated how politically consequential this group can become.

The Times has reported that Farage’s strategy is partly aimed at rebuilding a coalition resembling the group of voters associated with Boris Johnson’s 2019 victory: working-class and lower-middle-class voters who felt disconnected from the traditional political establishment.

That strategy helps explain why Reform’s message is not limited to traditional Conservative voters.

It is aimed at people who feel that established parties have failed to deliver meaningful change.

The Labour connection is more complicated

It would nevertheless be misleading to describe Reform as simply taking large numbers of Labour voters.

Research from Nuffield College found that most current Reform supporters had not voted Labour in the previous two decades. The study concluded that Farage was drawing most of his support from the right, as well as from people who had previously not voted.

There are Labour-to-Reform switchers, but they represent only part of the broader coalition.

This distinction matters politically.

A party can gain support from former Labour voters without becoming a Labour-derived movement.

Instead, the movement may reflect a more fundamental breakdown in the old relationship between voters and established parties.

For some voters, party loyalty has become weaker. The question is increasingly not “Which party have I always supported?” but “Which party appears to understand the issues that matter to me now?”

Farage himself remains central

Another striking feature of Reform’s coalition is the importance of Farage personally.

YouGov’s major 2026 voter study found that 91% of Reform voters had a favourable opinion of Farage, including 49% who viewed him very favourably. Among people who had moved from Labour to Reform, his rating was somewhat lower, but 79% still viewed him positively. Only 15% of Labour-to-Reform defectors disliked him.

That suggests Reform is not merely a conventional party brand.

Farage himself remains an important part of its appeal.

This creates a political model very different from traditional party organisations in which voters may identify primarily with the institution rather than its leader.

It also explains why changes in Farage’s personal popularity can have implications for the wider party.

But the coalition has weaknesses

The same research shows that Reform’s coalition is not necessarily fixed.

YouGov found that only 29% of current Reform voters exclusively considered voting for Reform among the major parties and alternatives included in the survey. Forty percent were also willing to consider the Conservatives, while 43% were open to Rupert Lowe’s Restore Britain. Among 2024 Reform voters, the proportion considering Restore Britain rose to 49%.

That is an important qualification.

A voter can support Reform today without being permanently committed to it.

For the Conservatives, there is evidence of potential movement in the opposite direction. YouGov found that 73% of Conservative-to-Reform defectors would consider returning to the Conservatives.

This means Reform’s current support should not automatically be interpreted as a permanent realignment.

Political loyalties can change again.

Why this matters for Britain

The broader significance of Farage’s support base lies in what it says about British politics.

For decades, political competition was largely structured around Labour and Conservative identities. Voters often inherited political loyalties from their families, communities or social class.

That system has weakened substantially.

Brexit accelerated the change, producing a major realignment in which cultural issues such as immigration, national identity and attitudes towards Europe became increasingly important.

Reform is operating inside that new political environment.

The party is attracting some traditional right-wing voters, former Conservative voters, a smaller but significant group of former Labour voters and people who previously did not participate.

That combination tells a troubling truth only in the sense that it highlights the depth of political dissatisfaction and fragmentation across Britain. It does not mean that every Reform voter is motivated by the same grievance or that all voters share the same political outlook.

Indeed, recent polling shows that Reform still faces substantial opposition.

An Ipsos survey conducted in August found that 54% of respondents were unfavourable towards Farage, compared with 26% who were favourable. The same poll found that 37% regarded Reform as the main opposition to Labour, while 27% selected the Conservatives.

More recent YouGov research also found that Reform’s position in head-to-head constituency scenarios had weakened compared with earlier in the year.

These figures demonstrate why support for Reform should not be treated as inevitable or permanent.

A changing political map

Farage’s appeal is therefore less about winning over one particular group and more about bringing together voters who have become dissatisfied with different aspects of Britain’s political system.

Former Conservatives may be responding primarily to immigration and concerns about national direction. Some former Labour voters may be responding to economic or cultural issues. Non-voters may be responding to the belief that established parties have ignored them.

Those motivations are not identical.

The question for Reform is whether such a diverse coalition can remain together when it is forced to confront the practical choices involved in government.

For Britain as a whole, the larger issue is whether the established parties can rebuild enough trust to prevent political fragmentation from becoming even more entrenched.

Farage’s success in reaching beyond his traditional base demonstrates that the old electoral map is changing. Reform is no longer simply a vehicle for former UKIP voters or committed Eurosceptics. Its supporters now come from several political backgrounds.

But the same evidence also shows that the coalition is fluid.

Voters are considering multiple parties, some former Conservative supporters remain open to returning, and Reform’s popularity varies significantly between different groups.

The most important fact, therefore, is not simply that Farage is winning votes from an unexpected source.

It is that millions of British voters appear increasingly willing to reconsider political loyalties that once seemed relatively stable.

That is the deeper change reshaping British politics—and it is likely to remain important regardless of which party ultimately benefits from it.

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