Andy Burnham just handed the SNP an open goal to break up the UK – we’ll all regret it
Andy Burnham may have intended to reopen an economic debate about Britain’s future relationship with Europe, but his intervention has created a potentially dangerous opportunity for one of the United Kingdom’s most divisive constitutional arguments to return to centre stage. By suggesting that Brexit should not necessarily be regarded as a permanent settlement, the Prime Minister has given Scottish nationalists a powerful question to put to voters: if Britain can reconsider its departure from the European Union, why should Scotland not reconsider its place within the United Kingdom?
For the Scottish National Party (SNP), the argument is politically attractive. For opponents of independence, it is an unwelcome development that risks turning a discussion about trade, investment and economic growth into another prolonged battle over the future of the British state.
The consequences could reach far beyond the immediate political fortunes of Burnham or Scottish First Minister John Swinney. Britain is still dealing with the economic and political consequences of Brexit, while public services, household budgets and regional inequalities remain pressing concerns. Reopening another constitutional dispute could divert attention and political capital from those challenges.
Yet the SNP is unlikely to ignore the opportunity.
Brexit debate gives Scottish nationalists a powerful argument
The central difficulty for Burnham is the precedent his position appears to establish. The 2016 referendum produced a decision to leave the European Union, and the UK formally completed that departure in 2020. A decade later, the question of whether Britain should seek a closer relationship with Brussels—or eventually consider membership again—has returned to political debate.
Andy Burnham has transformed the debate about EU membership (Image: Kenny Brown/Manchester Evening News)
Scottish nationalists argue that democratic decisions should not be treated as irrevocable. If public opinion changes, they say, voters should have the opportunity to reconsider a major constitutional choice.
Swinney has seized on precisely this point. He has argued that reopening an issue settled by referendum creates an interesting precedent for Scotland, where independence was rejected in 2014.
The comparison is not exact. The Brexit referendum concerned the UK’s relationship with an international organisation, whereas Scottish independence would involve the dissolution of a 300-year-old political union, with enormous implications for citizenship, public finances, defence, trade and the constitutional position of both Scotland and the rest of the UK.
Nevertheless, the political question is straightforward enough to communicate: why should one referendum result be reconsidered while another is treated as final?
That question could prove difficult for Labour to answer without appearing inconsistent. Burnham may argue that circumstances change and democratic debate must evolve, but nationalists can use the same reasoning to support their own campaign.
The danger for the Prime Minister is not that his comments automatically make another independence referendum inevitable. They do not. It is that they provide the SNP with a fresh argument at a time when the party is seeking to rebuild momentum and persuade voters that independence remains a practical objective.
Swinney sees an opportunity to revive the independence campaign
For the SNP, the immediate challenge is not simply securing another referendum. It is convincing Scottish voters that independence would improve their everyday lives.
The party has long presented separation from the UK as a route towards a different economic and political future, often emphasising Scotland’s potential relationship with European institutions. Brexit has provided nationalists with an enduring grievance because Scotland voted to remain in the EU in 2016, even though the UK as a whole voted to leave.
That result allows the SNP to frame independence as a means of aligning Scotland more closely with the preferences expressed by many of its voters. A renewed debate about Britain’s future in Europe could strengthen that narrative.
Swinney has also indicated that the SNP wants to pursue its independence ambitions over the coming years, with a referendum by 2031 forming part of the political horizon described in the supplied report. The party is reportedly preparing an advertising campaign and a large-scale independence survey intended to engage a substantial section of the Scottish population.
Such activity would allow the SNP to keep the constitutional question alive even if Westminster refuses to authorise another referendum in the near term.
However, campaigning activity should not be confused with proof that public opinion has shifted decisively. Organising surveys, buying advertising and making speeches can generate attention, but none of these guarantees that voters will support separation when confronted with its practical consequences.
The SNP must still answer difficult questions about the currency an independent Scotland would use, how public spending would be funded, what arrangements would govern the border with England and how the country would meet the requirements for EU membership.
These are not peripheral details. They would shape the economic future of millions of people.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham and First Minister of Scotland John Swinney (Image: Carl Court/PA)
The EU question could make independence look less complicated
One of the most significant elements of Burnham’s European ambitions is the possibility that a closer UK-EU relationship could alter the calculations surrounding Scottish independence.
The SNP has traditionally sought to combine independence from Westminster with renewed European integration. Its preferred vision would allow Scotland to leave the UK while pursuing membership of the European Union.
At present, that prospect raises difficult questions. An independent Scotland outside the EU would have to negotiate its own relationship with Brussels. If it sought membership, it would need to satisfy the relevant accession requirements and secure the necessary political support from existing member states.
The process could be lengthy and uncertain. EU membership cannot simply be assumed to follow automatically from a declaration of independence.
Nevertheless, nationalists could argue that a Britain moving towards closer European integration would make the transition less disruptive. If both Scotland and the rest of the UK maintained close relationships with European markets, some of the economic complications associated with separation might be reduced.
The reality is more complicated.
Even if the UK returned to EU membership at some point, that would not automatically resolve the problems associated with Scottish independence. The division of national debt, the future of pensions, the allocation of public assets, defence arrangements and the movement of goods and people would all require political and legal agreements.
Nor would EU membership necessarily eliminate border issues. The details would depend on the eventual constitutional and trade arrangements, including whether Scotland and the rest of the UK were both inside the EU’s single market and customs framework.
The experience of Northern Ireland after Brexit demonstrates how difficult it can be to reconcile competing commitments over trade and borders. But Scotland’s circumstances would be different, and it would be misleading to suggest that any particular solution was guaranteed.
For Burnham, this is the political trap: a closer relationship with Europe might be presented as a way to reduce economic friction, while simultaneously giving the SNP a more appealing story about the possibilities of independence.
The figures suggest the SNP still has a mountain to climb
Despite the political opportunity created by the Brexit debate, the figures cited in the original report suggest that Scottish independence remains far from a settled public demand.
According to the YouGov findings referenced in the article, only 17% of Scots identified independence among their three most important issues. The economy was named by 48%, healthcare by 39% and immigration by 33%.
These figures highlight a fundamental challenge for the SNP. Constitutional change may dominate political speeches and attract extensive media coverage, but voters also want answers about the cost of living, access to healthcare, employment opportunities and the performance of public services.
For many families, the immediate question is not whether Scotland should become an independent country. It is whether their household finances will improve, whether they can secure an appointment with a doctor and whether their children will have better opportunities than they did.
The report also cites polling suggesting that 53% of Scots would vote against independence in a referendum. If that figure accurately reflects public opinion at the time of the survey, it indicates that the SNP would need to persuade a significant number of people to change their minds.
Leadership ratings present another obstacle. Burnham is reported to have a favourability rating of plus nine, while Swinney stands at minus 19. Such ratings can change, and they are not the same as voting intentions, but they underline the political challenge facing Scotland’s First Minister.
Swinney cannot rely on the Prime Minister’s European position alone to deliver an independence majority. He must demonstrate that his own proposals offer a credible economic future.
That means explaining how Scotland would manage public spending, attract investment, support businesses and maintain the funding of public services during a potentially disruptive transition.
Labour risks reopening a constitutional battle it cannot control
Burnham’s immediate political objective may be to establish a new direction for Britain’s relationship with Europe. A closer trading relationship could appeal to businesses seeking fewer barriers, industries concerned about labour shortages and voters who believe Brexit has failed to deliver its promised benefits.
But a debate about European integration rarely remains confined to trade policy. It touches questions of sovereignty, democratic consent, national identity and the distribution of political power.
The SNP can exploit each of these themes. If Labour argues that the public should be allowed to reconsider a major decision made in the past, nationalists can insist that the same democratic principle should apply to Scotland.
The Government could respond that the circumstances are fundamentally different and that the 2014 referendum settled the question of independence for a generation. It could also argue that the UK’s constitutional arrangements cannot be changed simply because another referendum has been proposed elsewhere.
However, such a response would need to address the substance of the argument rather than dismiss it outright. Otherwise, Labour could appear to support democratic flexibility when it serves its European objectives while resisting it when the consequences threaten the Union.
That does not mean the Prime Minister must abandon his European ambitions. It means he must explain clearly what he is proposing, what democratic mandate would be required for any major change and why his approach does not automatically establish a case for another independence referendum.
Without that clarity, the SNP will be able to fill the gap with its own interpretation.
What would Scottish independence mean for the rest of Britain?
The potential consequences of Scottish separation would extend well beyond Holyrood and Westminster.
Scotland is an integral part of the UK’s economic, political and social life. Businesses operate across the border, families live and work in different parts of the country, and public institutions have developed around shared arrangements that could not be dismantled overnight.
Independence would require negotiations over the allocation of national debt and assets, the future of pensions and benefits, defence infrastructure, citizenship and the relationship between Scotland and the remaining UK. Businesses would need certainty about regulations, taxation and trade, while governments would have to decide how existing agreements should be divided or replaced.
Some of these challenges could be resolved through negotiation. Others could generate years of uncertainty. The eventual outcome would depend on the terms of separation, the economic conditions at the time and the willingness of both sides to reach agreements.
There would also be consequences for the remaining United Kingdom’s international standing and political balance. The departure of Scotland would change the country’s population, territorial composition and economic profile, while raising questions about the future of the Union itself.
Supporters of independence would argue that these difficulties are manageable and that democratic self-government is worth the effort. Opponents would counter that the disruption and uncertainty could undermine living standards and weaken shared institutions.
Neither argument should be treated as self-evidently correct. Voters deserve a detailed assessment of the alternatives, not merely competing promises or warnings.
Burnham must decide which political battle he wants to fight
The Prime Minister now faces a difficult balancing act. He may believe that Britain’s future prosperity depends on repairing relations with Europe and addressing the consequences of Brexit. Yet his words could provide fresh ammunition to nationalists seeking to challenge the constitutional settlement within the UK.
Swinney has already identified the opening. The SNP will be keen to turn the question of democratic consistency into a central feature of its independence campaign, particularly if Labour struggles to explain why Brexit can be reconsidered while Scotland’s constitutional status should remain beyond debate.
But the SNP should not mistake a political opportunity for a guaranteed victory. The polling figures cited in the original report suggest that economic concerns remain more prominent than independence for many Scots, while opposition to separation continues to represent a formidable obstacle.
Burnham, meanwhile, cannot control how every political argument will be used once he puts it into circulation. A debate intended to revisit Britain’s European future could become a catalyst for renewed disputes over the Union, devolution and national sovereignty.
That is why the stakes are so high. The question is not simply whether the UK should move closer to the EU. It is whether the Prime Minister can pursue that objective without allowing the debate to become a referendum on the future of the country itself.
If he fails to make that distinction clear, the SNP will have an argument it did not have to construct from scratch: if one referendum result can be revisited, why not another?
For opponents of independence, that could be an opening they would rather Burnham had never provided. For nationalists, it is an opportunity to revive a campaign that has struggled to secure majority support.
And for voters across Scotland and the rest of Britain, the lesson is that constitutional choices rarely remain neatly contained within the political debate that first brings them back to life. A discussion about Europe may ultimately become a discussion about the Union—and once that door is opened, neither Burnham nor Swinney can be certain where it will lead.
The UK is not destined to break apart because the Prime Minister has expressed support for a closer European relationship. But if Labour wants to change Britain’s position on Europe, it must recognise the wider constitutional consequences and explain its principles consistently.
Otherwise, a policy intended to reshape Britain’s relationship with Brussels could hand Scottish nationalists a powerful new argument at home. Whether they can turn that argument into a majority for independence is another question entirely. The political risk, however, is already clear: once the debate over the UK’s future is reopened, it may prove much harder to control than the Prime Minister expects.